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INTRODUCTION
Since the attainment of political independence, African leaders have repeatedly
expressed their commitment to regional Integration, mainly for political and eco-
nomie reasons. One result is that Africa now has the largest number of regional
integration arrangements in the world. Unfortunately, our historical review of these
schemes will provide ample evidence that most of them have remained ineffective
or dormant.
The issue of regional integration has acquired a new relevance and urgency in
Africa of late due to wide-reaching changes globally and nationally. For various
reasons, contemporary Africa has been forced to operate m a far more hostile
external context than a decade ago. Among these are the demise of the Soviet
communist ideology and the opening up of markets in Eastern Europe. African
leaders have become deeply concerned that such changes will further dimmish aid
and capital flows to Africa. Moreover, the past years have witnessed a decisive move
towards the formation of regional trading bloes - Europe, the Americas, and East
Asia - which pose a severe threat to Africa's trading prospects. Africa's Situation has
become all the more alarming as its national economies are experiencing a deep and
prolonged economie crisis. That is why virtually all African states have been
compelled to implement IMF and World Bank-mandated Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) in one form or another. SAPs are intended to tighten up
government expenditures in order to reduce the budget and balance-of-payments
deficits. Their central demands include eliminadon of subsidies; dismantlmg of pnce
controls; 'rationalization' of the state sector through privatization, layoffs, wage cuts
and closures; liberalization of the economy, guided by 'market forces' domesticallv
and 'comparative advantage' internationally; promotion of commodity exports and
foreign Investment; and currency devaluation (Daddieh 1995).
By all accounts, African leaders have become more convinced than before that
Africa has no choice but to pursue regional Integration if it is to transcend its
growmg marginalization in the global economy and lts severe economie crisis. Their
renewed commitment to regional Integration was clearly expressed during the June
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1991 Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit meeting at Abuja, Nigeria. On
that occasion, they signed a treaty to establish an African Economie Community
(AEC) by the year 2025, complete with an Africa-wide monetary union.
In this chapter we wish first to review the various regional integration schemes
that came into existence in the aftermath of independence, and then to try to explain
the reasons for their relative failure. Finally, we will examine the consequences of
Africa's rapidly changing position in the global economy for regional integration.
THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION SCHEMES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Regional economie integration schemes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) seek äs else-
where to expand intra-regional trade and, eventually, to create economie unions
between member states. There are typically four stages in the process of creating
such a union: the establishment of a preferential or free trade area by reducing or
eliminating barriers to trade between member states; the creation of a customs
union involving free or preferential trade between members plus the creation of a
common external tariff on Imports from non-member states; the initiation of
a common market where capital and labour join goods and non-factor services in
a free flow between member states; and the realization of an economie union when
common fiscal and monetary policies (the latter implying a single central bank) are
added to the common market (Martin 1992; McCarthy 1995). The economie
argument in favour of integration essentially rests on the potentials which a larger
market size wiü create (Aghrout 1992). It would enable African firms to benefit
from the advantages of the 'economies of scale' principle, allowing them to optimize
their production capacities and thus reduce their production costs to (internation-
ally) competing levels. Furthermore, the pooling of scarce resources through coop-
eration and integration would increase the efficiënt use of available economie and
social means of production, at the same time serving the goal of lower production
costs. Integration would also trigger increased trade between partners which in turn
would enhance regional inter-industry linkages and induce production growth in
individual countries.
In addition to the predominant economie rationale for regional integration,
several factors have furthered the proliferation of these schemes in Africa (Lan-
caster 1991; Daddieh 1995). First, regional economie ties have a long history in
Africa. Long-distance trade throughout Africa existed before the Europeans arrived.
While colonialism undoubtedly disrupted and even altered some patterns of inter-
action, it did not completely destroy all such ties. Moreover, the colonial powers
even organized some economie activities - trade, fmance, monetary affairs, admin-
istrative responsibilities, transport and communication networks — on a regional
basis. A number of these arrangements survived into the independence period,
including the monetary unions between francophone countries and France, and the
East African Common Services Organization comprised of Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania.
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Second, African states gained independence at a time when regional Integration
was populär among developing countries and other parts of the world. Latin
American states, supported by the Economie Commission for Latin America,
were experimenting with their own schemes of regional cooperation, including
the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Area.
Asian states soon followed with the creation in 1967 of the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The European Economie Community (EEC),
initiated with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, was already functioning,
and it provided a model for groups of developing countries wanting to create their
own regional Integration schemes.
Third, African leaders brought with them to independence their own aspirations
towards Continental or regional unity. One group, the Panafricanists, favoured
political Integration äs a prerequisite to economie Integration. Its members
(Kwame Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, Modibo Keita, Cheikh Anta Diop) advocated
the immediate and total Integration of the African continent, and the setting up of a
single Continental government with common institutions. Another group, the
Gradualists or Functionalists, anxious to preserve the African states' recently
acquired sovereignty, favoured a more gradual approach to African Integration.
This group (Felix Houphouét-Boigny, Jomo Kenyatta, Leopold Senghor) held that
economie Integration should precede political Integration. Its members championed
loose cooperation in non-controversial areas (technical and economie issues) and
viewed regional institutions as a stepping-stone towards the increasing political and
economie unification of the continent. In the end, the Panafricanists had to accept
major revisions to their original vision to enable a continental interstate organiza-
tion, the O AU, to be born in May 1963. Significantly, this organization was not
given the authority to make decisions that were binding on member states. Regional
cooperation among African governments centred thenceforth primarily on eco-
nomie objectives.
Fourth, given the small size of African markets and the difflculty, if not impos-
sibility, of gaining access to markets of the industrialized world, many African
leaders and the Economie Commission for Africa (ECA) perceived regional Integ-
ration as a means to effect import-substitutmg industrial growth. Regional Integra-
tion, in fact, was to provide the necessary protection and training ground for
industrial development:
Regional Integration in this way becomes an iiiward-looking instrument of
industrial development, diverting trade from cheaper sources in the rest of the
world to higher cost producers within the union. Aligned to this argument for
protection, but viewed from the opposite end of the spectrum, is the view
that the larger protected market could serve as a training ground within which
long-protected domestic industries can cut their competitive teeth in the
larger regional market before being exposed to the harsh condiüons of the
global market-place.
(McCarthy 1995: 215)
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Fifth, regional Integration has often been projected as the most appropriate strategy
to cut the heavy dependence of African states on international trade and to realize
collective economie self-reliance. For instance, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA),
adopted by African Heads of State at the OAU meeting at Lagos in April 1980,
proposed an African Economie Community aiming at 'the promotion of collective,
accelerated, self-reliant and self-sustaining development of member states' (Danso
1995).
Finally, regionalism has been diffkult to resist politically. There is a general
recognition on the part of African leaders of a need to act in concert in order to
enhance their bargaining position vis-ä-vis foreign governments, international institu-
tions and multinational corporations.
Regional Integration in Africa
It is interesting to observe that regional integration efforts in post-colonial Africa
initially were based on regional integration schemes introduced by the former
colonial powers. We want to briefly discuss here three such initiatives. One of the
first attempts was the creation of the 'Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique
centrale' (UDEAC) on 8 December 1964. This union, comprising the Central
African countries Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, revamped the Equatorial African Customs Union
(UDE) created by France in 1959. Though the objective of the UDEAC was the
creation of a common market, it has made very little progress since. Several reasons
can explain why UDEAC member countries have failed to achieve any significant
economie integration. They include heavy dependence on export of primary com-
modities to the industrialized market economies, restriction of free trade movement
of resources among member countries due to government regulation of economie
activity or competitive nationalism, and French dominance of the economies of
UDEAC countries, resulting in French influence on the patterns and direction of
their trade.
The next serious attempt at economie integration in Africa was the establishment
of the East African Community (EAC) by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in
December 1967, which was based on various forms of cooperation during the
British colonial period. The Community began with a shared currency, a regionally
coordinated infrastructure, harmonized economie policies, a system of common
institutions, and unrestricted labour mobility. However, this promising scheme
collapsed within a decade because of dissatisfaction with the distribution of the
benefits of integration. Tanzania and Uganda feit the arrangements worked to
the benefit of Kenya, the most industrially developed country of the three. The
emergence of General Idi Amin as President of Uganda soured its relationship with
Tanzania and also disrupted the meeting patterns of the Community. Ideological
differences between capitalist Kenya and socialist Tanzania made cooperation
difficult. Moreover, the Community members all maintained strong trade relations
with Britain, further diminishing the chances for Integration.
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Another important Integration scheme was the 'Communauté économique de
l'Afrique de l'Ouest' (CEAO) established in April 1973. It was the successor
organizarion to the 'Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique occidentale'
(UDEAO), a free trade area set up within the Framework of the former French
West African Federation. lts membership included seven francophone West Afr-
ican states, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Tvory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and
Senegal. Like UDEAC member states, CEAO members were also part of the franc
zone system and its affiliated institutions. The World Bank declared in 1989 that the
CEAO has been the most successful among Africa's market Integration schemes
(World Bank 1989). While this may be the case, the organization has certainly also
experienced various problems and difficulties. First of all, there has been little or no
progress towards implementing the measures of positive integration required to
establish an economie entity. The common external tariff, scheduled for January
1985, was not implemented. In addition, most member states continued to operate
certain trade restrictions in defiance of the Treaty provisions. Furthermore, the
absence of a regional industrial policy resulted in duplication of industrial efforts. In
fact, the industrial development of the CEAO countries was heavily dependent
upon investment by foreign (French and American) multinational corporations
(Martin 1992: 76-77).
Following these and other tentative beginnings, there have been several renewed
attempts to forge regional integration. There is no space to fully discuss all these
schemes (see Aly 1994). Here we will review only the foremost current ones. These
can be divided into two broad groups: those that fit into the historie 1980 LPA, and
those that emerged outside the LPA.
The LPA sought to promote Africa's long-term industrialization and develop-
ment through the creation of larger, sub-regional markets and, eventually, of a
continent-wide market by merging the sub-regional markets. The ECA sponsored
the setting up of three regional arrangements which covered the following SSA sub-
regions: West Africa, East and Southern Africa, and Central Africa. West Africa was
to be served by the Economie Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with
sixteen member states. ECOWAS actually pre-dated the LPA, having been estab-
lished in 1975, and it served as a model for subsequent integration schemes within
the framework of the LPA. East and Southern Africa was to be served by the
Preferential Trade Area (PTA), established in 1981 but put into Operation in 1984,
with nineteen member states. In 1993, the PTA was superseded by the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Central \frica was to be
served by the Economie Community of Central African States (ECCAS), with ten
member states. Though the treaty establishing ECCAS was approved back in 1983,
its implementation is süll under negotiation. Together with the Arab Maghreb
Union (AMU), established m 1989, with five member states, these arrangements
were expected to bring about an all-African common market by the year 2000.
These LPA schemes were clearly over-ambitious. They appear to have been
motivated first and foremost by political considerations: the introduction of large
trading bloes enabled the OAU to give expression to its Panafrican ideal. They did
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not sufflciently take into account the various economie problems facing regional
Integration in Africa. In fact, they were simply superimposed upon the already
existing Integration arrangements. This created the problem of overlapping mem-
berships and conflicts of divided loyalty. Litde wonder that none of them have
achieved their Integration targets within the timetables adopted. ECOWAS has
perhaps been the most visible and certainly the most closely studied one (Asante
1986; Okolo and Wright 1990; Lancaster 1991; Martin 1992). lts experience shows
the negligible progress these schemes have made in economie terms and their
eventual exploitation for political and diplomatic ends.
ECOWAS
ECOWAS was established on 28 May 1975 mainly at the initiative of Nigeria, which
strove to counter French influence in the region and to enhance its own. This was
the first regional attempt to integrale French, English and Portuguese-speaking
African states with a combined population of over 185 million and a GDP of
JUS123 billion. Economie union of the sixteen member states (Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo) was planned to
come about in three stages. In the first two-year period, members were to freeze
their tariffs on primary products produced by other members and on manufactured
goods eligible for preferential treatment in intra-ECOWAS trade. The second
period, which was to last eight years, was to culminate in the elimination of import
duties on intra-ECOWAS trade. The final stage would last five years and involve the
imposition of a common external tariff. For products to qualify for tariff conces-
sions within the Community, a local ownership rule required eventual 51 per cent
local ownership, as well as 35 per cent local value added.
To compensate the poorer members of ECOWAS for the costs of participation
in rhe Community, a Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development was
set up. ECOWAS members were to contribute to the fund on the basis of their
relative income levels and their gains from new investments in the community.
Finally, a West African Clearing House was set up in association with ECOWAS to
facilitate the use of local currencies in financing intra-ECOWAS trade.
While institution building has proceeded apace, no significant progress has yet
been made towards positive integration in ECOWAS. Intra-community trade has
remained low, amounting to only 5 per cent of the total trade, and has even shown a
steady tendency to decline. Indeed, trade liberalization has made little progress: no
common external tariff has yet been established, the 1981 deadline for the freezing
of tariff rates was not met, and little has been done towards implementing the new
timetable.
The less developed ECOWAS member states also fear that the support and
compensation arrangements will prove inadequate in the face of the dominant
position of Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Senegal. Furthermore, ECOWAS's rule of
product origin has become a source of serious disagreements. The rule bolsters
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indigenous manufacturers but restricts exports from Ivory Coast and Senegal (since
their industrial plants are considered foreign Investment) and discourages foreign
Investment. More crirically, the pattern of trade has not altered. Ivory Coast and
Nigeria still dominate the export of manufactured goods. Instead of progress on
labour mobility, there was a setback: in 1981 and 1983, Nigeria expelled more than l
million Ghanaian migrant workers.
There is no movement of capital within the region because capital markets
remain underdeveloped. Lack of progress in the payments system is due to the
failure of ECOWAS (notwithstanding its declared long-term commitment) to
establish a single monetary zone, with a common currency and a pooling of foreign
exchange reserves. Non-compliance of member states includes a failure to con-
tribute their füll agreed payments to the Community budget and their capital
contriburion to the fund. ECOWAS Integration efforts have been further compli-
cated by several other economie and political factors. lts sixteen members also
belong to the Lomé Conventions: thus, 70 per cent of ECOWAS's principal exports
go to Europe, and indeed, the latter was the largest source of foreign aid for all but
two of the ECOWAS states in 1987. Internal cohesion has been undermined by the
chaotic sociopolitical landscape typified by civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone
and political instability in Gambia, Togo and Nigeria. Internal cohesion has also
been affected by France's economie and political dominance over its former
colonies, creating problems of conflicting memberships and loyalties. Some have
attributed ECOWAS's slow pace of integration to the so-called Nigerian factor,
which refers to the fear of domination by Nigerian political and economie power in
the region. Despite these multiple problems, most heads of state continue to attend
the annual meetings, vociferously reaffirm their commitment to the goals of the
organization, and frequently approve new and often ambitious schemes for
ECOWAS to undertake. According to Lancaster (1991), two benefits, both of
them political, derive from ECOWAS's annual meetings. One is the exposure
heads of state receive in their own media and in the media of other West
African states by participating in a meeting with a large number of other heads of
state. But probably more important are the opportunities offered by these annual
meetings for the political leadership of West Africa to deal with regional issues of
importance to them which would not readily be dealt with in the much larger annual
meetings of the OAU or at the bilateral level. ECOWAS thus appears to be
becommg a regional political or diplomatic organization, and this evolution may
sustain it even in the face of its failure to realize its formal goals of economie
integration.
Other regional integration schemes
Turning to the group of integration arrangements that came about outside the LPA,
there are two important ones which are associated with the Communauté Financière
Africaine (CFA) franc, UEMOA and CEMAC. Within the ambit of ECOWAS
there is the West African Economie and Monetär)' Union (UEMOA), whose
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members — Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mäh, Niger and Togo — share a
common central bank, the Central Bank of West Afncan States (BCEAO) And
withm the ambit of ECCAS there is the Economie and Monetary Union of Central
Afnca (CEMAC) - Cameroon, Central Afncan Repubbc, the Congo, Gabon, Chad,
and Equatonal Guinea — with lts central bank, the Bank of Central Afncan States
(BEAC) Withm the geographical area of COMESA there are the Southern Afnca
Customs Union (SACU), with lts associated monetary umon, the Common Mone-
tary Area (CMA), and the Southern Afncan Development Community (SADC)
SACU — with South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland as
members - is a well established customs union that currendy operates under the
terms of an agreement concluded m 1969, but which äs an operating unit goes as far
back äs 1910 SACU is an exceptional Integration scheme in the Afncan context in
the sense that it has common external tanffs SADC started out as the Southern
Afncan Development Coordmation Conference (SADCC), set up in 1980 as a mne-
member orgamzation of the Frontline States — Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe The political aim of
SADCC was to bring independence and majonty rule to Zimbabwe, Namibia, and
South Afnca lts economie aim was to reduce the dependence of lts member States
on South Afnca and the industriahzed countries through cooperation on specific
projects in prionty areas such as transport and Communications, food, secunty, and
energy SADCC's relative success as a regional cooperation orgamzation was pardy
due to lts focus on action rather than on Institution building In the early 1990s, the
achievement of Namibian independence and the imminent demise of apartheid m
South Africa challenged the very existence of SADCC In August 1992 the Treaty of
Wmdhoek was adopted, launchmg the SADC Whereas SADCC was structured on
the basis of regional cooperaüon, SADC, like COMESA, has an Integration agenda,
albeit one with an enabling nature without a fixed framework of target dates moving
towards the establishment of a common market Besides regional Integration,
SADC also aims at cooperation in the areas of security, peace, democracy, and
conflict resolution South Africa became the eleventh member of SADC in Novem
ber 1994, Namibia havmg jomed its forerunner at independence m 1990 (McCarthy
1995, Mistry 1995)
Failure of regional Integration schemes
Trade flgures are a painful reminder of the failure of most Afncan Integration
schemes to achieve their pnmary goal of promoting regional trade expansion The
World Bank (1989) estimated that official trade among Sub Saharan Afncan coun
tries amounts to a paltry $US4 billion, or only 6 per cent of total Afncan trade This
share of intra regional trade in total trade is conspicuously low compared with
Western Europe (72 per cent), Eastern Europe (46 per cent), Asia (48 per cent) and
North America (31 per cent) (McCarthy 1995 219) It is, however, important to
emphasize that a substanüal volume of mtra-regional trade in SSA continues to take
place through mformal channels which are often subject to varying degrees of
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official interference and harassment. Such informal exchanges across Africa's
permeable borders are partially re-establishing the extensive pre-independence net-
work of trade in goods and the associated migratory patterns.
There are various reasons for the failure of most regional integration schemes in
Africa. Some of these have already been touched on above. First, integration
arrangements demand a high level of political commitment and administrative
expertise, which is often lacking in Africa. When the creation and strengthening
of national identity are in füll swing, as in many African countries, governments are
naturally loath to sacrifice national sovereignty and control over economie policies.
Moreover, African leaders are often divided on major political and ideological
issues.
Second, political will is also affected by gains and losses from integration. One of
the basic problems of regional integration schemes is that the economie costs of
participation for member states can be immediate and concrete, while the economie
benefits typically accrue only after a long period, are uncertain, and are often unevenly
distributed among member states. The costs include, first, a decrease in government
revenues when tariffs are reduced. Another cost may be the collapse of local firms
as they find themselves unable to compete with firms in other member countries,
resulting in a loss in national income, production and employment. This is the
polarization effect of economie integration. The poorer members of the economie
union often perceive that they are losing opportunities for industrialization and they
demand compensation.
Third, institutional proliferation is bedevilling African regional integration
schemes. To a large extent, the activities of these schemes overlap and are not
coordinated, resulting in a duplication of functions and multiple membership. In
Southern Africa, for example, Lesotho and Swaziland are members of SACU, CMA,
SADC, and COMESA. In West Africa, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali,
Niger, Senegal and Togo are members of UEMOA and of ECOWAS. Mauritania is
a member of both ECOWAS and AMU. Such multiple membership inevitably
leads to problems of incompatible and potentially conflicting objectives, and
raises the issue of divided loyalties and primary allegiance; it also Stretches to the
limit the African countries' already scarce human, administrative and financial
resources.
Fourth, there is the deficiency in infrastructural provisions, such as transport and
telecommunication services and fifth, the play of extraregional politics is another
factor seriously affecting the cohesion of African regional integration schemes. In
particular, France's continuing economie and political dominance over its former
colonies is a permanent irritant and a major obstacle to the progress of integration
arrangements in West and Central Africa.
The sixth and paramount problem, however, is that the present economie
Situation in Africa is not conducive to integration and expansion of intra-regional
trade. There is a great diversity in size and level of economie development. And,
above all, African economies are not complementary, many of them producing the
same range of primary commodities exported to the industrialized countries, leaving
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little room for trade among themselves Most of these economies also lack the
capacity to develop complementary sectors, consequently, a sound base for growth
m mtra-regional trade through mter-mdustry trade does not exist
Structural Adjustment Programmes
Some authors also pomt out that some aspects and objectives of the Structural
Ad)ustment Programmes (SAPs), which are m the process of bemg implemented in
several Afncan countries, may actually mihtate against regional Integration (cf
Asante 1991; Daddieh 1995, Mistry 1995). They argue that the present SAP
measures may have senous repercussions on regional Integration, at least m the
short term, as they are typically nationally onented The emphasis of SAPs on
achieving immediate mcreases in export earmngs has tnggered compeütion among
Afncan states in their efforts to maxirnize exports of the same pnmary commod-
ities. This has a deletenous impact on pnces and thus on the net earmngs from
exports. Afncan countries find themselves in a competitive Situation which tends to
undermme the cause of cooperation. Furthermore, the SAP reform of macro-
economic policies m national contexts also clashes with the need to regionally
harmomze these types of policies (m particular exchange and trade policies). SAPs
are averse to forms of positive discnmination, for example, reciprocal preferential
tanffs or selective non-tanff barners (as practised in PTA and UDEAC), which seek
to foster trade withm the area of Integration SAPs' goal of trade liberalization opens
the door for relatively cheap Imports of manufactured goods. This quickly out-
competes fragile Afncan industries and threatens to remove any basis for regional
mdustrialization programmes in the future. Dramatic budget cutbacks as mandated
by SAPs are m conflict with the necessity to contnbute financially to regional
development plans. As a consequence of the (SAP-related) retrenchments m the
public sector, the capacity to provide state personnel for the Implementation of
regional Integration plans is also dimimshed. Fmally, SAPs bring about a
reduction of domestic effective demand (due to a drop in consumer pur-
chasing power) This will very likely discourage Imports from partner states,
which again is not compatible with the required process of Afncan Integration
and cooperation. Confronted by what they perceive as an increasingly hosüle
international environment and the severe crisis of Afncan economies, Afncan
heads of state recendy reaffirmed their commitment to regional Integration In
their meeting at Kampala m May 1991 they concluded that the only viable way
out of the development crisis facmg Africa is the redoubling of efforts towards
early, effective Continental Integration. On that occasion, the former Nigerian
Leader, General Olusegun Obasanjo, did not mmce his words- "While the world
is grouping into bloes to strengthen national economies, Africa remains fragmented
and drifting, and is therefore in danger of being completely marginaksed' (Daddieh
1995: 259). One month later at the OAU summit meeting at Abu|a, Nigena, Afncan
heads of state signed a new treaty for the establishment of an Afncan Economie
Community (AEC) and an Africa-wide monetary umon by the year 2025. The AEC
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will seek the elimination of custom duties, the abolition of quantitative and admin-
istrative restrictions on trade, the establishment of a common tariff and a common
commercial policy, the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons,
services and capital, the harmonization of agricultural, environmental, monetary and
industrial policies, the promotion of Community solidarity, the creation of a com-
pensation fund (Danso 1995).
AFRICA IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
Meanwhile, rapid developments in the global trading System have led to the
establishment of a few powerful trading bloes, which are likely to present an
immediate challenge (or threat) to Africa's trade prospects. These emerging eco-
nomie groupings include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
integrating the USA, Canada and Mexico; the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA) in
South-East Asia, signed in 1994; and the EC whose countries moved closer to unity
after the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the signing of the European Single Act of
1993. In particular, the EU Single European Market (SEM), enlarged with Medi-
terranean, Nordic and Eastern European countries, will profoundly reshape Eur-
ope-African relations in the near future, including those arrangements made under
the Lomé Conventions (Tibazarwa 1994).
Furthermore, the opening up of markets in Eastern Europe following the
demise of the Soviet communist System will provide new opportunities for
Investment in and trade with the EU member countries on the part of the
Eastern European countries. It is expected that both the enlargement of
the EU trading bloc and the growing attention for Eastern Europe will
gradually lead to further EU disengagement from the African continent
(Daddieh 1995).
The completion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in December 1993
and the subsequent creation of the World Trade Organisation (replacing GATT)
has triggered another significant change in the international economie setting. Sub-
Saharan Africa is expected to be adversely affected by a gradual erosion of trade
preferences previously granted to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
under the Lomé Conventions. It is feared that increased global competition,
accompanied by further tariff liberalization, \vill ultimately cause Africa to lose
ground m EU markets. The more competitive Asian Newly Industriabzing Coun-
tries (NICs) are likely to squeeze out African exporters.
In short, in the context of the new global realities, Africa has to operate in a far
more hostile external environment than a decade ago. Africa is rapidly losing
ground, in fact, in the global economy. lts share of world GNP and world trade
has sunk to insignificant levels. SSA's proportion of world exports which stood at
an already low 2.4 per cent in 1970, further sagged to a mere l per cent in 1992.
Africa's share in world cocoa production feil from 70 per cent in 1970 to 51 per cent
in 1991 and lts share m coffee production plummeted from 33 per cent in 1970 to
19 per cent in 1991 (UNCTAD 1993). Private direct investment, now mounting
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world-wide to $US200 Billion per annum, has also largely bypassed African eco-
nomies. In 1992 less than l per cent of this flow reached SSA countries (Adedeji
1993). Moreover, the composition of Africa's exports has scarcely changed: primary
agricultural products (cocoa and coffee) still account for a major proportion of total
export earnings, just äs they did some thirty years ago.
The basic problem is that SSA remains excessively dependent on a few non-
manufactured exports for which world market prices continue to fall due to the
limited growth in global demand. Recent expansion in world trade has been in
manufactured goods and services, not in raw materials. Africa's tragedy is that it has
failed to move away from its primary agricultural commocüties, enlarging the
manufacturing component in its export structure. Manufactured goods amount to
just 5 per cent of total SSA exports. In other words, SSA has painfully failed to
diversify its exports base. Related to this problem, has been the serious deterioration
in SSA's terms of trade (import/export price ratio) during the 1980s and into the
1990s. The resulting sharp drop of around 25 per cent in the 'purchasing power' of
export earnings at the end of the 1980s has undermined SSA's capacity to import
the goods and services crucial to maintaining its production levels. To continue the
list of unfortunate events, SSA countries have also not been able to benefit from the
preferential trading relationship with the EU laid down in the Lomé Conventions.
In 1975, ACP countries accounted for 20 per cent of the total of imports from
developing countries into the EU. But even though most ACP exports could be
imported duty-free, this dropped to only 11 per cent in 1990 (Betz 1994; Global
Coalition for Africa 1995).
In the light of the worrisome external trade performance of SSA countries, the
question of how the Uruguay Agreement and the Single European Market will affect
SSA countries' trade prospects becomes paramount. Not enough time has passed
yet to empirically assess the outcomes for SSA countries, nor for other developing
regions. The few studies carried out thus far have therefore applied econometrie
models (usually neo-classical partial or general equilibrium analytical frameworks) to
predict quantitative outcomes of the new global trade arrangements.
The principles and assumptions underpinning these models are in many cases
irrelevant or even misleading, when it comes to the real economie and social
characteristics of specific countries, which are obviously extremely difficult to
incorporate into such models. Consequendy, the outcomes of quantitative estimates
of 'gains and losses' resulting from further trade liberalization must be handled with
great caution (for a critical view, see Walker 1994). If we keep this in mind, it is not
surprising that outcomes for SSA countries vary from one study to another
depending on the model and methodoiogy applied. For example, the OECD
calculated (in 1993) a global gain of SUS195 billion resulting from a 50 per cent
reduction in world-wide trade restrictions. Developing countries as a group were to
see their exports grow to a total of $US50 billion. Most of this gain was to go to Asia
(SUS31.6 billion) and Latin America (SUS9.6 billion). SSA was also to gain, but to a
very modest degree: JUS2.2 billion, amounting to just 4.4 per cent of the total gain
for developing countries.
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Sharply contrasting with this, however, are the conclusions drawn in two other
recent studies which forecast a loss, rather than a gain, for SSA countries once the
Uruguay Agreement is fully implemented (Yeats 1995; Davenport 1995). The basic
reasoning here is that SSA countries stand to lose from the Uruguay Agreement
because their extensive tariff preferences in the OECD markets will disappear as a
result of the overall lowering of trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff types) following
the agreement. Trade losses will be incurred by those countries which see their
'preference exports' replaced by exports from third, non-preference countries.
Theoretically, of course, export gains resulting from the general lowering of tariffs
could more than offset the losses from the disappearing preference exports but this
is not likely to happen.
To gain more insight into the fate of SSA during trade liberalization, one needs to
identify the destination markets of SSA exports and see how these markets will
implement trade Iiberali2ation. Yeats found that (in 1988) about 78 per cent of SSA
exports went to industrialized countries, including 47 per cent destined for the EC
and 24 per cent for North America. Japan only attracted 3 per cent of SSA exports
and less than 10 per cent went to other African countries (the remaimng 16 per cent
were scattered around the globe).
Clearly the conclusion is that the EC and, to a lesser extent, North America's
handling of trade liberalization is of prime interest to SSA prospects. Analysing the
types of products in SSA exports, as a next step, reveals the importance of 'raw
materials and non-temperate zone foodstuffs' (cocoa and coffee), and the insigni-
ficance of manufactured goods, in the export structure of SSA (except oil exports).
OECD tariffs and other trade barriers are relatively high for manufactured goods
but low or nil for the primary products of the type SSA is exporting. This means
that SSA will gain little from tariff cuts, since they apply to an unimportant category
of products from the point of view of SSA. Of more significance to SSA is what
happens to the preferences now enjoyed by African exporters to the EC. It is
known that no less than 97 per cent of each African country's exports now enter the
EEC duty-free. This is in sharp contrast to the conditions for countries in Asia, for
example, only 4 per cent of Taiwan's exports are duty-free, the rest being subject to
tariffs averaging 7 per cent.
How large would the replacement of African exports be in the event of a
complete EU liberalization of duties? Yeats used a World Bank trade projection
model known as Smart (what's in a name!) and found that African annual trade
losses would amount to $US250 million. This represents about 2 per cent of the
total current value of SSA exports to OECD countries. Among the heavy losers are
Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe. 1t was calculated that in
Japan losses will amount to $US14.3 million and in the USA a gain of ÏUS89 million
can be reaped, meaning that the combined result in the three OECD markets would
amount to about SUS203 million losses annually. Taiwan and Korea, by contrast,
will gain substantially from complete tariff liberalization in the EU, to the tune of
SUS2.3 and $US2.4 billions (!) respectively. The overall conclusion is that SSA
countries will continue losing ground in the international trade flows as the Uruguay
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Agreement moves forward In the second study (Davenport 1995), a partial equilib
num model was used to esümate SSA losses m export earrungs resulting from
'preference erosion' compared to the year 1992 Davenport's conclusion is that
tanff liberalizaoon on tropical (agricultural) products and fish will cost Afncan ACP
countnes $US156 million in lost export revenues Coffee, tobacco and cocoa are the
mam losers, and the countnes most adversely affected are Cameroon, Ivory Coast,
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe Moving to the mdustnal category of metals,
mmerals and wood products, we find estimated losses of $US176 million Countnes
most affected are those where metals form a key export product, such as the Congo,
Ghana, Guinea, Zaïre and Zambia Adding to this a loss of $US173 nulbon in
export revenues from 'temperate agricultural products' bnngs the total to $US505
milbon in lost revenues (ibid) This represents around l l per cent of Afnca's total
export earnmgs in 1992 These outcomes may not seem dramatic, but one must
realize that for individual countnes which in most cases are dependent on a few
export products, losses may be far-reachmg The five Afncan countnes that will lose
a relatively large share of their export earmngs are Mauritius, Zaïre, Malawi,
Mauritama and Madagascar
It should be emphasized that the chosen methodology of estimaong the effects of
trade kberabzation allowed only the calculaaon of so-called 'static losses' The
dynamic effects generaled by future Investment decisions and government policies
have not been taken mto account According to Davenport, these could substan-
tially mcrease the losses
It should be noted that both observers, after acknowledging that SSA countnes
will be adversely affected by mcreased global trade liberabzation and increased
global competition, hasten to emphasize that 'interna! defïciency factors' have also
reduced SSA's export supply to OECD markets Reference is made to such factors
as inadequate mfrastructure, the lack of entrepreneurial skills, msuffïcient Invest-
ment funds, inadequate incentives, the hostile climate for foreign Investors and the
lack of an appropriate policy framework All such factors are crucial to achieving a
level of industriabzation which would make possible an mcrease of manufactured
exports mto OECD markets (ibid) In his suggesuons for 'offsetting policies' to
combat trade losses, Yeats stresses the important contribution SSA countnes
themselves could (and should) make an 'aggressive liberalization' of their own
high-tanff trade barriers Such a reform could clear the road for increased mtra-
African trade
This brings us back to the problem of SSA's increased marginalization in the
world economy Probably the only way to halt and reverse this process is a firm
commitment to the establishment of well-functioning regional groupmgs, which
could eventually grow to become genuine competitors in world markets A positive
note is that trade liberalization m OECD countnes is expected to generate a rise in
world income which will probably also mcrease the demand for SSA exports
In order to survive, a more umted sub Saharan Africa must seize these new
opportunities It must succeed in recapturmg lost market shares m the future
world economy
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CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
Notwithstanding the deepening economie and politica! crisis in a large number of
SS A countries in the 1990s, governments continued their efforts towards greater
regional integration on the continent. An example is the creation of the 'African
Economie Community' (although not yet functional) in May 1994 as a follow-up of
the 1991 Abuja Treaty.
In recent years a change in the approach to integration is clearly emerging. The
current trend is away from trade arrangements per se and towards broader regional
project and sectoral coordination, policy harmonization and the creation of regional
infrastructural and institutional frameworks. The basic idea is that in order to
facilitate the trade integration process, a sound regional policy environment is a
sine qua non but achievements are not yet encouraging.
In West Africa the revised ECOWAS Treaty was signed in 1993. Ratification
progressed very slowly, however. In 1995 only nine out of the sixteen member states
had actually ratified the new ECOWAS. Equally disappointing has been Nigeria's
decision to reverse the trade liberalization reforms it had begun in 1986. This
country has always been suspicious of the Franc Zone membership of its fellow
ECOWAS partners.
In Eastern and Southern Africa the PTA was transformed in 1993 to COMESA,
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. This new arrangement aims
at the creation of a customs union and enhanced coordination of monetary and
financial policies, including füll currency convertibility and a fair distribution of
integration benefits among its member states. In the same area we already men-
tioned SADCC's transformation into SADC (Southern African Development Com-
munity) in 1992. Whereas the old SADCC focused on project and sectoral
coordination, the new SADC's Intention is to move to greater trade liberalization
through tariffand non-tariff barrier reduction (Aryeetey and Oduro 1996). The fact
that these two organizations now have similar objcctives and a large overlap of
membership (SADC incorporates several COMESA member states) make the co-
existence of the two arrangements questionable and is already creating rivalry for
financial resources. COMESA's prospects were weakened after South Africa joined
SADC in November 1994. This last event may have drastic implications. Initially
both the former SADCC and PTA were set up to dimimsh dependency on apart-
heid South Africa. With the emergence of a new South Africa m 1994, Southern
African economies find themselves in an enürely new economie and political era
and more dependent on South Africa then ever before. This country will undoubt-
edly increasingly set the terms for future Integration efforts in the region (Mistry
1996). This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the present domestic and
international context has become remarkably different from what it was a decade
ago. Contemporary Africa is confrontcd with an increasingly hostile external en-
vironment as well as with a dramatic crisis of its national economies, and this has led
to the widespread adoption of SAPs. Anxious to forestall a further marginalization
of the continent, African leaders have regularly reaffirmed their commitment to
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regional Integration Given the disappoinüng achiexement of pre\ious regional
Integration schemes in SSA, however, one cannot avoid the following question
how can the chances of success for a renewed commitment to regional Integration
be enhanced5
As discussed above, there are formidable poliücal and economie obstacles to
regional Integration in Afnca That is why a growmg number of scholars and
development msütuüons advise African leaders to adopt a more pragmaüc and
flexible approach to regional Integration which views market Integration as a long
term objective (McCarthy 1995, World Bank 1989) This approach reqmres the
designmg of mcremental but comprehensive steps to regional cooperation and
Integration, the strengthenmg of specific funcüonal forms of cooperation — involv
mg collaboration between independent countries or agencies on identified projects
or schemes — and the creaüon of an enablmg environment for the free movement of
goods, services, labour and capital To this end, resolute leadership is needed to
overcome parochial and entrenched mterests and to ensure that benefits are shared
equitably A more active role by governments and the OAU will be cntical m this
respect
SADCC, one of the most successful regional cooperation schemes in Afnca,
exemplified such an approach It promoted regional cooperation in the form of
sectoral development (for example, project cooperation m sectors such as transport
and Communications, water arid electricity) Such forms of regional cooperaüon
could lay the foundation for eventual market Integration and the acceptance of loss
of sovereignty that this will entall
This does not imply that the current regional schemes, based on the model of
market Integration, should be abandoned The importance African leaders attach to
the creation of common markets even excludes such a possibility However, the
political and economie realities of Afnca caution agamst the creation and preserva-
tion of over ambitieus Integration arrangements Meanwhile, one important step
towards improving the functiomng of existing schemes would be to discontinue
multiple memberships m arrangements which have more or less the same object
ives Our histoncal review of regional Integration schemes in SSA provides ample
evidence that such multiple memberships have often given nse to confiicüng
mterests, thus impeding the advance of regional Integration efforts
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